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The effectiveness of the coordinating role of the market 
through the price-system, and of the State through its intervention 
policy, depends on the type of information and the knowledge base 
inherent in the nature of the coordination problems to be solved. 
Market deficiencies can arise in part from the existence of informa-
tion asymmetries due to the dispersion of information among de-
centralized decision units, as in investment decisions. Overcoming 
these may require not j ust i nformation flows but also shared 
knowledge bases, for example to recognize and flag the salience 
of a particular investment decision for growth. Governmental 
agencies, as permanent organizations with an ad hoc institutional 
set-up, can potentially allow the development of such a common 
knowledge base across organizations, underpinning their coordi-
nating role in the economic system. The paper suggests that such 
a role helps explain the success of state-inspired industrial recov-















1.  Introduction 
 
 
One of the main problems in economic systems is that market-
functioning through the price system does not always guarantee 
the coordination of economic agents essential for achieving inter-
mediate objectives favoring economic growth. The need for coor-
dination concerns several factors affecting economic growth. A 
relevant example, often considered in the literature, relates to the 
effects of the lack of coordination in the case of investments. For 
instance, Wade (1990) observes that investments in one firm may 
generate by-products or externalities positively affecting other 
firms; in the form, for instance, of the availability of goods, services 
and technological capacity. Along with the externalities generated 
by simultaneous investments, there are also the externalities cre-
ated by their intertemporal interdependence. Datta-Chaudhuri 
(1990), referring to pecuniary externalities
1, considers the external-
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1 Scitovsky explains pecuniary externalities in the following terms: “Investments in 
an industry lead to an expansion of its capacity and may thus lower the prices of 
its products and raise the prices of the factors used by it. The lowering of product 
prices benefits the users of these products; the raising of factor prices benefits 
the suppliers of the factors. When these factors accrue to firms, in the form of 
profits, they are a pecuniary external economy...” (Scitowsky, 1954: 301). 8 
ities generated by the intertemporal interdependence among firms 
and industries as ‘a serious impediment to the growth of a back-
ward economy’ in a price-guided system. 
An obvious part of the problem consists of maintaining or 
stepping up information flows among the interdependent firms and 
industries, but this may not be sufficient where intertemporal is-
sues are involved. The distinction between information and knowl-
edge can be crucial in overcoming market deficiencies in the solu-
tion of such coordination problems, which necessitates matching 
the actions of agents who have a common interest. In this respect 
a shared body of knowledge provides economic agents with com-
mon cognitive tools, essential for a common understanding and 
representation of coordination problems. In detail, a shared knowl-
edge base is necessary, on the one hand, to individuate coordina-
tion problems and their specific features, the economic agents in-
volved, and the set of options available to them, and, on the other, 
to interpret and frame the problem of choice in a similar way. 
In this paper it is argued that governmental organizations can 
be endowed with a form of corporate knowledge that gives them a 
cognitive advantage in comparison even with institutionally organ-
ized private agents. That cognitive advantage allows governmental 
agencies to learn and identify coordination problems among the 
agents concerned. Finally, they can provide better coordination so-
lutions and devise how to coordinate the decision-making of pri-
vate agents in order to achieve their own goals. It is essential to 
stress that the development of this corporate-oriented knowledge 
base of government organizations is made possible firstly by their 
attribute of being permanent and secondly by their set-up, which 
can be such as to allow the transmission of information and the 
consequent accumulation of knowledge. 
Finally, in our paper, the Japanese experience during the 
1950s is considered as a meaningful example of an articulated ad-
hoc institutional set-up, which enhanced information flows within 
governmental institutions and between the latter and the private 
economic sector. This helped the evolution of a specific and com-
mon knowledge base within Japanese governmental agencies, 
which contributed to shaping the industrialization policy required to 
pursue the final goals of the government. The existence of a com-
mon knowledge base allowed governmental agencies to play a 9 
coordinating role in the functioning of the economic system during 
the early stages of advanced industrialization, in particular in re-
gard to investments and related policies. 
The structure of the paper is the following. In §2, the role of 
shared knowledge in the solution of coordination problems will be 
analyzed, taking as an example the case of investments. In §3 at-
tention will be paid to the heuristic component of knowledge, 
whereas in §4 the focus will be on how it is possible within organi-
zations to accumulate a common knowledge base related to the 
solution of coordination problems. In §5 the characteristics of gov-
ernmental organizations favoring the emergence of this type of 
knowledge will be considered. Japanese intervention policy in the 
1950s will be taken as a significant example in §6 and the conclu-





2.  Coordination problems: the case of investments 
 
 
The analysis of coordination among investment decisions, 
though considering only the case of investments, helps to emphasize 
the relevance of coordination related to spillovers and strategic com-
plementarities in the functioning of the economic system. As to spill-
overs, the benefits to each of the economic agents involved can be 
affected by changes in the strategy of the others (Cooper and John, 
1988); for instance, in the case of simultaneous investments, the 
greater availability of technological capacity generated by one firm’s 
investment can increase the profitability of the investments of other 
firms. Strategic complementarities imply that the optimal strategy of 
each of the agents involved is raised by the increase in the others 
(ibid.). This can happen, for instance, when there are demand link-
ages and investments in an industry generating pecuniary external-
ities, which may affect the optimal level of production of other sectors. 
The latter feeds back into the demand for the products of the former 
sector. Thus, in this context coordination means matching the actions 
of agents who have a common interest, which implies that they can 
get higher benefits by coordinating their own decisions. 10 
2.1  Investments and coordination failure 
 
The coordination problem related to investment-related strate-
gic interdependence can be illustrated by a specific game without 
pre-play communication, in which a firm A in some industrial sec-
tor, by investing, for instance, in a new product, can increase the 
profitability of the investment in the production of some new com-
modity of a firm B in another sector. This in turn stimulates the 
demand for the product of firm A. The latter aspect allows for de-
mand linkages between the firms, which can obtain greater bene-
fits from coordination. The set of strategies available to firm A is 
(a1: invest in the new product; a2: do not invest in the new product), 
whereas the set of strategies available to firm B is (b1: invest in the 
production of the new commodity, b2: do not invest in the produc-
tion of the new commodity). Let us consider for simplicity a sym-




FIG. 1 – INVESTMENT COORDINATION 
Game a a 
    FIRM A 
    a1  a2 












This payoff matrix implies that if both do not invest (payoff 4), 
their initial conditions will not change, as firm B and firm A by not 
investing will not get any profit increase. Firm B can increase its 
profit when it can use the new product made available by the in-
vestment of firm A (1), whereas when the new product is not avail-
able, it will, for instance, only bear the costs of the investment (2). 
If firm A invests and the other does not, the demand linkages simi-
larly cause the former to bear only the costs of the investment (3). 
There are two coordination equilibria ((1), (4)), which are Pareto-
ranked. In the game, strategic interdependence makes coordina-
tion (1) desirable. If one assumes complete information on the 
payoff function and the strategy space, that they are common 
knowledge, and that the equilibrium selection criterion excludes 
the Pareto-dominated outcome, equilibrium (1) prevails. 
However, when there is strategic uncertainty concerning the 
equilibrium selection criterion, it may occur that decision-makers 
follow the principle of risk dominance (Cooper et al., 1992), ac-
cording to which ‘a secure action is an action whose smallest pay-
off is at least as large as the smallest payoff to any other feasible 
action’ (Van Huick et al., 1990: 889). This causes a coordination 
failure, as the evaluation of the riskiness of deciding to invest leads 
to the inefficient equilibrium outcome (4). The main implication is 
that, in the case of strategic interdependence, investments may be 
suboptimal due to a selection criterion that causes a single firm 
when making investment decisions not to take into account the 
positive simultaneous effects on other firms. 
Hence, in order to overcome the problem of the coordination 
failure when the description of the game does not suffice to identify 
focal point equilibria, it is crucial that agents' choice of strategy be 
based on the beliefs/expectations about their opponents' choice of 
strategy, underpinned by factors external to such description. Ex-
pectations can firstly be based on the exchange of information dur-
ing pre-play communication. The latter entails that players simulta-
neously send non-binding messages that they intend to play the 
risky strategy, which can enhance the emergence of the efficient 
solution (Cooper et al., 1992). But secondly, expectations can be 
also underpinned by the salience of the opponents' choice of strat-
egy (Mehta et al., 1994). Salience is characterized by specific fea-
tures/labels of strategies that are more prominent than others 'by 12 
virtue of analogies or associations of ideas which connect those 
labels to common experience, culture or psychology of the players' 
(idem: 659, our italics). Thus each decision-maker chooses the 
strategy whose feature/label she believes most likely to be promi-
nent for her opponents. 
In this respect, Van Huick et al. (1990, 1991) underline that 
salience can concern not only deductive selection principles based 
on the description of the game, like payoff-dominance or risk-
dominance, but also inductive selection principles, based on indi-
viduals' past experience. If one considers the iteration of the coor-
dination game, agents can form their expectations and learn how 
to coordinate by exploiting the information embodying historical 
precedent. For the selection o\f an equilibrium based on historical 
precedent to happen, it 'requires decision  makers to focus on 
some salient analogy to a past instance of the present equilibrium 
selection problem and to expect others to focus on the same anal-
ogy' (Van Huick et al., 1991: 892). Thus, one important aspect is 
that agents share the information concerning the historical experi-
ence. This type of information helps coordination by affecting indi-
vidual expectations and the equilibrium selection criterion, depend-
ing on the analogy between the present and past coordination 
problems. As in the case of investments the iteration of the same 
coordination game may represent an unlikely event, it seems rea-
sonable to believe that learning from the past concerns the histori-
cal precedent of an analogous coordination problem. So one im-
portant implication is that the exchange of information among 
agents can play a considerable role in overcoming coordination 
failures. 
Beyond that, it is important to underline that a shared body not 
only of information but also of background knowledge helps agents 
to identify the existing strategic interdependencies and the profit 
opportunities deriving from exploiting them. Moreover, shared 
knowledge, by providing an interpretative frame of the functioning 
of the economic system and by indicating prospects of future 
higher profit deriving from investment interdependencies enhanc-
ing growth, can induce decision-makers to decide to invest and to 
overcome coordination failures. This implies that a common inter-
pretative background of reference, often embodying past experi-
ence, shapes decision-makers' e xpectations on their opponents' 13 
choice of strategy through the identification of the salience of the 
efficient solution, and also helps them 'to focus on some salient 
analogy to a past instance of the present equilibrium selection 
problem'. This role of knowledge drawn from experience is further 
developed in the next section. 
 
 
2.2  Investment strategic interdependencies enhancing economic 
growth 
 
Another important feature of coordination among investment 
decisions is that, not only should agents exploit strategic interde-
pendencies, but they should also choose those interdependencies 
that particularly foster the process of economic growth. This latter 
aspect of investment strategic interdependence can be illustrated 
by a game which is such that a firm (A) in some industrial sector 
has to choose to invest, for instance, in one of three different types 
of new products. The availability of each product can respectively 
increase the profitability of the investment in the production of 
some interdependent new commodity of a firm (B) in another sec-
tor. This in turn is assumed to stimulate the demand for the prod-
uct chosen by firm A. The latter aspect again allows for demand 
linkages between the firms, which can obtain greater benefits from 
coordination. The type of strategy available to firm A is ai: invest in 
the new product i where i = 1,2,3; whereas the type of strategy 
available to firm B is b i: invest in the production of the interde-
pendent new commodity. It is also hypothesized that the choice of 
strategy 2 by both players (i = 2 and B invests in the relevant inter-
dependent new commodity) fosters the process of economic 
growth, which will allow for higher gains in the future with respect 
to the other choices of strategy, though this does not belong to the 
description of the game. Let us consider for simplicity a symmetric 
payoff matrix corresponding to a pure coordination game where 






FIG. 2 – INVESTMENT COORDINATION 
Game b b 
    FIRM A 
    a1  a2  a3 
b1  10, 10  0,0  0,0 
b2  0,0  10,10  0,0  FIRM B 




This payoff matrix implies that if both firms invest in the inter-
dependent goods, they will gain an increase in their profits, other-
wise the increase will be null. Here the case of complete informa-
tion on the payoff function and the strategy space is considered - 
that they are common knowledge. The equality among the payoffs 
on the diagonal allows focusing on the problem of how individuals 
acquire equilibrium beliefs by resorting to factors external to the 
description of the game. This aspect plays a crucial role in this 
analytical framework. If the payoffs were Pareto-ranked, the princi-
ple of payoff dominance would have helped decision-makers to 
coordinate in order to bring about the efficient solution. The rele-
vant issue in game b though is to understand how individuals can 
coordinate over strategy 2, which is assumed to trigger economic 
growth and future greater profits. In this respect it is important that 
agents' expectations be sustained by the salience of their oppo-
nents' choice of strategy (Mehta et al.,  idem.). Interestingly, in 15 
Colman's view, the choice of strategy according to salience can be 
sustained by a common body of background knowledge and in-
formation, which helps agents t o interpret/frame the problem of 
choice in a similar way (Colman, 1997). This leads to the consid-
eration that a shared interpretative frame of reference shapes de-
cision-makers' expectations about their opponents' choice of strat-
egy through the identification of the salient selection criterion. In 
our specific example, shared knowledge can be such as to provide 
decision-makers with a broad understanding of the relevant strate-
gic interdependencies among investments and of the growth-
oriented strategies. The i ndividuation of the options enhancing 
growth and development contributes to delineating their future 
higher profit prospects with respect to the choice of the other 
strategies. From this perspective, the choice of strategy 2 b e-
comes salient and may prevail over the others. Thus, this type of 
background knowledge, if shared, induces agents to describe to 
themselves the available set of options in a similar way 
(Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997) and to expect that their oppo-
nents' choice of strategy focuses on the salience of strategy 2. 
In more detail, drawing heavily on Bacharach and Bernasconi 
(idem) who use Variable Frame Theory, it is hypothesized that 
each decision-maker can describe the strategies of investing to 
herself by resorting to the same interpretative frame/background 
knowledge identifying a family of attributes of the object to choose. 
Therefore, important components of agents' decision making are: 
-  The family {F} of attributes of the products in which each firm 
has to decide to invest, that can be defined as contribution to 
growth/higher future profit prospect. Hence F:  {enhancing 
growth (EG), non-enhancing growth (NEG)}. 
-  The option set (OS) in which an option corresponds to choosing 
to invest in one of the products presenting just one of the two 
attributes; otherwise, if there is more than one product with the 
same attribute, it corresponds to choosing to invest in a product 
at random. Hence OS: (choose to invest in the product NEG at 
random; choose to invest in the product EG; choose to invest in 
one of the three products at random (PROD)). 
These two components transform the matrix of game b in the 
following way: 
 16 
FIG. 3 – INVESTMENT COORDINATION 
Game g g 
    FIRM A 
    EG  NEG  PROD 
EG  10,10  0,0  1/3(10), 
1/3(10) 
NEG  0,0  1/2(10), 
1/2(10) 
1/3(10), 
1/3(10)  FIRM B 









In game g, where the strategies have been replaced by the op-
tions, the uniqueness of attribute EG allows for the payoff domi-
nance of the corresponding option. Thus, the label belonging to the 
decision-makers’ common framework attached to strategy 2 - the 
association with EG - helps decision-makers to focus on this op-
tion. 
The main implication of this analysis is that it is possible to 
single out a theoretical space where shared knowledge can play a 
significant role in coordinating investment decisions on the choice 
of the strategy enhancing growth. The latter can be driven by a 
body of background knowledge such as to provide decision-
makers with the cognitive tools necessary to feature the existing 
strategic interdependencies along with the benefits derived from 
exploiting them, and to spot the investment option essential for 
economic growth. Such knowledge has to be necessarily shared 
by all the agents involved in the coordination problem, as this as-17 
sures that each one will focus her expectations about the others' 
choice of strategy on the same option  considered  as salient, 
following the common description of the strategic interaction. 
In conclusion, it is possible to single out two aspects related to 
the solution of coordination problems: the first concerns informa-
tion exchange among decision-makers in order to overcome coor-
dination failures. More importantly, the second regards the role of 
a shared body of background knowledge, which initially contributes 
to identifying the existing strategic interdependencies and the profit 
opportunities derived from exploiting them. Subsequently, by en-
dowing agents with an interpretative frame of reference this can 
lead them, on the one hand, to overcome strategic uncertainty and 
to decide to invest, and on the other to choose those investment 





3.  Heuristic knowledge 
 
 
An important aspect of coordination is related to how individ-
ual decision-makers perceive and learn a coordination problem in 
order to feature it and to draw the benefits from exploiting strategic 
interdependencies. This implies that individuals have to be able to 
single a coordination problem out. Once the problem has been in-
dividuated, in order to solve it, a crucial role is played by how 
agents form their expectations on other individuals' behavior and 
adopt a specific selection criterion in order to coordinate. Both in-
dividual learning and decision-making processes can be fostered 
by exchange of information and the endowment of knowledge in-
herent in the specific features of coordination among economic 
agents, which have been little analyzed. In this theoretical frame-
work as previously specified, coordination means matching the ac-
tions of agents who have a common interest and the related coor-
dination problems can be caused by a lack of knowledge, which, 
following the well-known Hayek argument, is due to the fact that 
knowledge relevant for our decision-making exists only in the form 
of ‘dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory 18 
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess’ (Hayek, 
1945: 519). 
Hayek mainly refers to knowledge of ‘the particular circum-
stances of time and place’ (ibid.), which allows economic agents to 
pursue the maximization of their objective function and is con-
veyed through the price system. It is also important to develop 
more general knowledge, common to the agents involved in coor-
dination and favoring the internalization of externalities in individual 
choices and, thus, the achievement of collective welfare, which 
cannot always be obtained through price signals. This type of 
knowledge can be distinguished as know-what or factual informa-
tion (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Casson, 1997),  concerning 
mainly b its of information on the facts underlying coordination 
problems; and know-why or conceptual information (Lundvall and 
Johnson,  idem; Casson, idem)  referring to scientific knowledge/ 
heuristic theories, which in our example can be models of the 
causal relations allowing the identification of strategic complemen-
tarities in the economic system and their impact on economic 
growth. The main difference of the latter from factual information is 
that the source of ‘concepts and theories’ is not direct observation 
but rather ‘reflection upon observations, and the discernment of 
patterns in them’ (Casson,  idem: 172). It a llows identifying the 
relevant variables in the economic system and a model of the 
causal links among them. In our analysis, know-why represents 
the core part of knowledge as it can provide a general analytical 
framework and a broad view of the economic system functioning 
which transcends ‘the particular circumstances of time and place’, 
and as such is necessary to coordinate investment decisions. The 
more general the explanatory power of theoretical knowledge, the 
wider is the span of theory defined by the type and the number of 
the variables of its observation space, and the extent of the rela-
tionships established between the variables (Saviotti, 1996). A 
relevant aspect of heuristic knowledge so specified is that it can 
mainly concern permanent features of the coordination problems 
individuals are dealing with and though specific to the problems 
can be of interest to a great number and variety of agents in the 
economic system. 
Stemming from the above description, the role of knowledge is 
that of helping individuals to have a common understanding and 19 
representation of the functioning of the economic system and, 
thus, to individuate coordination problems and their features, the 
economic agents involved, and the set of options available to 
them. In this respect, the shared cognitive tools provided by the 
knowledge base enhance the matching of behaviors through the 
emergence of individual expectations that the other agents’ choice 
of strategy will focus on those options considered as salient ac-
cording to a common interpretation of the external world and a 
common system of beliefs (Mehta et al., idem). Thus, a shared 
knowledge influences the way decision-makers frame/interpret co-
ordination problems, and eventually allows focusing on efficient so-
lutions considered as salient. This implies that, on the contrary, if 
economic agents are endowed with a different stock of knowledge 
related to the problems they are facing, there may be problems of 
asymmetric or different cognition/ interpretation of the economic 
system-functioning. In this case, both individuating coordination 
problems and overcoming them are made more difficult by the lack 





4.  Learning and Organizations 
 
 
Agents can develop knowledge through the iteration of the co-
ordination game concerning either the same coordination problem 
or an analogous one involving different players, and can learn by 
exploiting the information embodying the history of the playing of 
the game when a coordination game has already been identified. 
More significantly knowledge can be fostered through a process of 
learning-by-interacting of economic agents, which entails commu-
nication and information exchange (pre-play communication). The 
latter is particularly important as over time it favors the acquisition 
of information on facts (know-what) such as other agents’ charac-
teristics and objectives, their current and past behavior, which can 
provide a potential coordination problem. Reflection upon pooled 
information can lead to 'discernment of patterns' in it and to either 
individuating a model of causal relations/heuristic knowledge or 20 
improving that already existing. Conceptual knowledge in turn can 
help filter new information gathered during the repetition of agents’ 
interaction related either to the same problem or a similar one. In 
detail, it allows first identifying and selecting valuable bits of infor-
mation on other individuals’ behavior and on relevant occurrences 
in the economic system, and subsequently processing and inter-
preting them in a coherent way. An important implication is that the 
shared body of knowledge can reduce the costs and the burden of 
information on agents by reducing the amount to gather and to 
store on the one hand, and by facilitating its selection and process-
ing. Such a process can contribute to give a better understanding 
of the causal relations underlying the strategic interdependencies 
in the economic system and their impact on growth. In fact, new 
information can shape and improve the conceptual part of knowl-
edge, as agents can learn from their own current and past experi-
ence or analogous experience following an inductive process. 
This implies adaptive learning underpinned by looking back-
ward, which naturally, relies on individual ability of systematically 
learning ‘from experience – from their own trials-and-errors as well 
as from observing others – what kind of behavior is more likely to 
be successful in certain kinds of situations’ (Vanberg, 1993:188). 
Learning from past experience leads not only to the emergence of 
behavioral routines (idem) but also to enriching the individual heu-
ristic framework, which, in our case, is necessary for the definition 
of a common area of interest and thus of the features of coordina-
tion problems. Moreover, learning from the past enhances the so-
lution of coordination, as agents can underpin the expectations 
about other people's behavior through the improved heuristic 
knowledge.  Perfect information, representing in particular the 
memory of their own and other agents’ past choices, along with 
complete information, related to the characteristics and needs af-
fecting the payoffs of economic agents, are important elements of 
know-what  and contribute t o the emergence and evolution of 
know-why and of the common knowledge base as a whole. In fig-
ure 4 it is sketched how the circuit of knowledge can work and the 











This raises the problem of the lack of information, as the dis-
persion of the learning process among decentralized decision units 
along with a wide variety of information may impinge on the acqui-
sition of information bits valuable for learning from past and current 
experience and for the emergence of a common and consistent 
SELECTION AND 
PROCESSING OF 
VALUABLE BITS OF 
INFORMATION 
INFORMATION GATHERED THROUGH 
-  THE ITERATION OF THE COORDINATION GAME A ND 
EMBODYING THE HISTORY OF THE PLAYING OF THE 
GAME  (WHEN A COORDINATION  GAME HAS ALREADY 
BEEN LEARNT). 
-  LEARNING-BY-INTERACTING  OF ECONOMIC  AGENTS, 
ENTAILING COMMUNICATION AND THE EXCHANGE OF 
INFORMATION ON OTHER AGENTS’  CHARACTERISTICS 
AND OBJECTIVES,  THEIR CURRENT AND PAST  BEHA-







- LEARNING OF COORDINATION PROBLEMS; 
 
- SOLUTION OF COORDINATION PROBLEMS 
THROUGH THE EMERGENCE OF INDIVIDUAL 
EXPECTATIONS THAT THE OTHER AGENTS 
WILL FOCUS ON THOSE OPTIONS CONSID-
ERED AS RELEVANT, FOLLOWING THEIR 
COMMON COGNITIVE TOOLS. 22 
perception and interpretation of the external world. In particular, it 
can be very difficult and expensive for private agents to gather all 
the information on the key interdependencies in the economy nec-
essary to coordinate investment decisions. Not only can these two 
factors – dispersion and variety – make search costs of information 
unaffordable to agents, but as a consequence can also transform 
any form of interaction among interested individuals, like commu-
nication and information exchange, into an unlikely event. Thus, 
they may lead to an information-asymmetric distribution, which can 
be characterized by the lack of complete and/or perfect informa-
tion, which, as previously argued, count in the emergence of 
knowledge and thus, in the identification and solution of coordina-
tion problems. 
In this respect, it can happen that economic agents, though 
getting higher benefits from coordinating their actions, may not ac-
tually meet and communicate. For instance, two industrial sectors 
can be potentially linked to each other through a strategic com-
plementarity. But each one may ignore the objectives, the charac-
teristics and current needs affecting the payoff function of the other 
(complete information), and the history of their previous choices 
along with its own (perfect information). This can lead to neglecting 
the existence of a coordination problem. 
When coordination problems are complex and need long 
spells of time to be learnt and solved – as often in the case of in-
vestments – not only the gathering but also the transmission of the 
information concerning permanent coordination features, repre-
sents a crucial factor. In fact, it makes possible storing the memory 
of past events and can easily occur if agents move within perma-
nent organizational forms to be considered as single learning play-
ers, like firms in our example. A relevant feature of organizations is 
that they are a governance structure defined by “ identifiable 
boundaries, in which members associate on a regular basis 
through a set of implicit and explicit agreements, commit them-
selves to collective actions for the purpose of creating and allocat-
ing resources and capabilities by a combination of command and 
cooperation’” (emphasis in the text, Ménard, 1995: 172). They are 
in turn formed by several agents, each active in distinct informa-
tional sets from a long-term perspective. Access to different infor-
mation can also be due to the internal set-up of the organization. It 23 
becomes necessary to transmit the information gathered through 
either learning-by-interacting with other players or the iteration of 
an analogous type of coordination problem, from one agent verti-
cally on to those following and horizontally on to those belonging to 
other sectors of the organization. Information transmission is en-
hanced if agents move within a permanent organization structured 
firstly in such a way to allow transmission itself and secondly with a 
specific objective function. 
The former characteristic allows establishing channels for 
gathering and internally transmitting information, and storing it. 
Hence, information can be passed on from one agent vertically 
and/or horizontally within the organization. This makes it possible 
to store the memory of past experience through the evolution of a 
common body of knowledge within the organization which helps to 
feature and to frame a coordination problems. In fact, as already 
argued, the history of past interactions allows the process of up-
dating its heuristic component and individual expectations. 
As to the latter structural characteristic, concerning the objec-
tive function, it is crucial to highlight that agents have to have their 
motivations aligned with the decisions deriving from the objective 
function of the control sphere, which is sustained by the incentive 
system of the organization. Moreover individuals recruited in the 
organization, by  sharing its common knowledge once it has 
emerged, are characterized by a common conceptual background, 
which avoids any misunderstanding in communication through a 
shared interpretation of transmitted information (Casson, ibidem). 
This guarantees that both the sender and the receiver decode and 
interpret information bits following the same conceptual tools and 
the d evelopment of a common knowledge base in a consistent 
way over time. The combination of these two factors fosters both 
learning and behavioral homogeneity of agents as to the final ob-
jective to pursue. Commitment to the goals of the organization 
through the incentive system also induces individuals to provide 
information necessary for the development of the shared knowl-
edge, though the latter may present the characteristics of a public 
good. 
If it is possible to overcome the problems related to the dis-
persion and variety of information which make gathering it for de-
centralized decision units difficult and expensive, within a perma-24 
nent organization there may occur the development of a corporate 
knowledge base. It embodies the memory of the past and sustains 
a common perception and understanding of the functioning of the 
economic system, which is crucial both for the identification of co-
ordination problems and their framing, and for the formation of ex-
pectations on the actions of the players with whom the organiza-
tion interacts. Thus, learning through information transmission be-
comes a corporate experience shared by all the agents involved in 
the pursuit of the organization objectives. This sheds light on the 
role of a corporate knowledge base in organizations as governing 
their collective learning process. The permanent nature of an insti-
tutional organization and its structure, seen from this perspective, 
favors the emergence and a continuous improvement process of 





5.  The coordinating role of governmental agencies 
 
 
Can governmental agencies be endowed with knowledge al-
lowing the state to play a coordinating role? The answer to this 
question can foster an in-depth understanding of state intervention 
in the economy. Coordination failures of decentralized decision 
units have often led to the advocacy of government intervention, 
based on the adoption of a coordinating function allowing the ex-
ploitation of strategic interdependencies, as it can provide “a big 
push, involving simultaneous expansion of several i ndustries” 
which “can insure profitability of each investment, even though 
each on its own would be unprofitable” (Wade, idem: 353). 
The reason why governmental agencies may be endowed with 
a stock of knowledge necessary to coordinate investments supe-
rior to that of private agents even if institutionally organized is cru-
cial. The main characteristic that can make governmental-agency 
corporate knowledge different from that developed in other forms 
of organizations derives from the fact that governmental organiza-
tions can gather information through learning by interacting with a 
broad variety of agents, ranging from other government agencies 25 
to private economic agents. This occurs because the solution of 
coordination problems among private agents often represents an 
intermediate stage in the achievement of the final objectives of 
governmental agencies. The latter can consequently gain some 
benefits from playing the role of a 'visible hand' by helping coordi-
nation and getting involved in some interaction with economic 
agents in the private sector. The interaction can encompass not 
only coordination among the activities of private agents but also 
coordination between the activities of some private economic sec-
tors and governmental institutions, and making these activities 
consistent with the final objectives of governmental organizations. 
Thus, though these agencies can be faced with dispersion and va-
riety of information, they are motivated to widen their observation 
space with respect to private agents. As to this aspect, in compari-
son with private agents, the “government may have 'better infor-
mation' about certain variables because it is a prime agent in their 
determination and has knowledge of the interactions in the econ-
omy as a whole” (Estrin and Holmes, 1983:45). This provides it 
with a quantitatively and qualitatively rich amount of information, 
which contributes to developing a knowledge base characterized 
by a broad and articulated picture of the economic system. The in-
stitutional set-up underlying information flows among government 
agencies and between them and private agents, can be such as to 
facilitate the access to information and to, accordingly, reduce the 
costs of gathering it. 
It is important to recall that agents within government organi-
zations/civil servants have to have their preferences aligned with 
the ones of the organization so that they can use the information 
gathered in the same way and it is possible to develop a consistent 
body of knowledge. This implies that if the objective func-
tion/preferences of the organizations is to further economic growth 
by fostering coordination, the information extracted and gathered 
will help the emergence and the improvement of knowledge nec-
essary to pursue this objective. Thus, it is not mistaken to hold that 
the type of knowledge developed in an organization is correlated to 
the objective to achieve. 
Gathered information can contribute to the knowledge base of 
governmental agencies as they can be considered as organiza-
tions that generally demonstrate the attribute of being permanent 26 
and can be structured in such a way as to allow not only internal 
information transmission (vertical and horizontal flows) but also 
transmission between them and private economic agents. These 
information flows can enhance the development and the updating 
process described above of a coherent body of knowledge, as 
quite often agents within governmental agencies are committed to 
the goals of the organization. Knowledge, on the one hand, im-
proves individual ability to select valuable bits of information, which 
reduces the burden of information to gather and to store, and, on 
the other, helps the solution of coordination problems among eco-
nomic decentralized decision units both at a macro-aggregate and 
a micro-aggregate level. Therefore, the agents belonging to gov-
ernmental organizations and endowed with this stock of knowledge 
can have a cognitive advantage in comparison even with institu-
tionally organized private agents. This advantage enables them to 
enlarge the set of options and unperceived opportunities, and thus 
to learn and identify coordination problems. Moreover, they may 
individuate the more suitable coordination s olutions and devise 
how to coordinate the decision-making of private agents in order to 
achieve their own goals. 
In the case of macro-level coordination among investments re-
lated to industrialization policies, governmental agencies can use 
the shared knowledge to underpin their intervention to favor the 
coordination among firms or industrial sectors. This is because it 
allows knowing and understanding the history of the economic sys-
tem and its functioning, and the characteristics of the economic ac-
tors involved along with their objectives, which is essential for the 
pursuit of the intermediate and final goals of the organizations. 
Thus, if their objective function is based on the pursuit of economic 
growth through, for instance, coordinating specific types of invest-
ments, it is possible to identify the specific coordination problems, 
to frame them and to find the solution. This can lead to the selec-
tion of some industrial sector/s or specific firms and to foreseeing 
the possible externalities generated by simultaneous investments 
and by their intertemporal interdependence, and finally to selecting 
appropriate options and devising how to induce private agents to 
internalize the externalities in their decision-making process. Sig-
nificantly, the intervention can be characterized by the provision of 
knowledge and information as public goods, which economic 27 
agents may need in order to overcome the problems associated 
with the lack of information. This can generate individual expecta-
tions that the choice of the other agents involved in coordination 
will focus on those options considered as salient according to a 
common interpretation of the external world consistent with the 
knowledge and information provided by the governmental organi-
zations. The perception of the expectation consistency influences 
the coordination of private agents’ decision-making, and in the long 
run the internalization of externalities deriving from investments. 
Thus, government intervention through its agencies can impor-
tantly affect the process of economic growth, as the set-up of 
these organizations, by favoring the access to and the transmis-
sion of information, can develop their own specific corporate 
knowledge which can further contribute to solving coordination 





6.  The case-study of Japan in the 1950s 
 
 
Japan has often been referred to as an exemplary country 
where, during the 1950s and ’60s, the state with its set of govern-
mental agencies played an important role in the industrialization 
process without preventing the functioning of market forces. In this 
respect, the process of Japanese economic growth was character-
ized by an articulated ad hoc institutional set-up (Johnson, 1983; 
Okimoto, 1989), which enhanced information flows between gov-
ernmental agencies and the private economic sector agents. 
In the post Second World War period, the priorities of the 
Japanese government were set in order to achieve economic 
growth and were based on past historical experience, which 
helped to gather a popular consensus on the final goal of catching-
up economic growth (Johnson, 1982). I n this respect, Okimoto 
(1989) underlines that the dynamic version of the theory of com-
parative advantages allows understanding the widespread inter-
vention of the Japanese state in the economic system. The main 
task of Japan from the mid twentieth century to the mid-1970s was 28 
industrialization, in order to catch up and compete with western in-
dustrialized countries. The main problem related to this choice 
were the limited factor endowments in terms of natural resources, 
capital stock and technology. To foreign observers ‘the strategy of 
concentrating on capital-and technology-intensive industries may 
seem illogical ... considering the comparative costs of production 
and Japan’s low wage advantages’ (ibid:22). Accordingly, the natu-
ral i ndustrialization path without state intervention, following the 
prediction of comparative advantage theory, would have been 
characterized by the adoption of a labor-intensive strategy. But the 
pressing need of its economic security in the international context 
induced the Japanese State to adopt an activist role in the indus-
trialization process, choosing sector priorities and shifting r e-
sources towards them. Economic security was related to the fea-
tures of the Japanese economy such as the lack of natural re-
sources, a large population, the need to trade and the constraints 
of the international balance of payments, partly characterized by 
the heavy dependency on foreign technology imports, and these 
affected the path to follow in order to overcome poverty. 
During the occupation period (1945-52), one of the main fea-
tures of the Japanese industrialization policy with the Priority Pro-
duction Formula was to concentrate the existing scarce resources 
in some selected strategic sectors like steel, chemicals, textiles, 
equipment and shipbuilding, in order to recover their production 
and to start new production. The aim of this intervention was an at-
tempt to substitute natural resource and technology imports by 
domestic production (Kosai, 1988: 33). In the reconstruction period 
(1952-1960) the purpose of policy intervention was industrial ra-
tionalization to promote exports in order to achieve the loosening 
of the external constraint by catching up and competing with west-
ern countries. The industrial rationalization was based on: 
1)  ... adoption of  new techniques of production, investment in 
new equipment and facilities, quality control, cost reduction, 
adoption of new management techniques and the perfection of 
management control; 
2)  the rationalization of the environment of enterprises, including 
land and water transportation and industrial location; 
3)  ... the creation of a framework for all enterprises in an industry 
in which each can compete fairly or in which they can cooper-29 
ate in a cartel-like arrangement of mutual assistance’ (John-
son, idem: 27)
2. 
The intervention policy adopted to loosen the external con-
straint implied the implementation of a coordinating role of the 
Japanese government in order to develop an autonomous indus-
trial capacity. For instance, the limits to resource and technology 
imports implied the internal development of dynamic production 
complementarities, as the profitability of investments and/or the 
level of production in an industry were linked to the investments in 
complementary industries substituting for imports. In this respect, 
national coal production and investments, with limited imports, af-
fected the profitability of investments in steel, electric power and 
chemicals, and investments in the steel industry, in turn, substitut-
ing for steel imports, were essential both for the level of production 
and the profitability of investments in the car industry and ship-
building (Vestal, 1993). Equally, the development of hydroelectric 
power was necessary for processing carbide, which was a raw ma-
terial in the production of synthetic fibers (Kosai, idem: 37).
3 Thus, 
in order to develop a competitive advantage with respect to west-
ern industrialized countries, it became important to get ‘industrial 
organization right in two senses: firm and inter-firm organization, 
and sector composition’, right sector composition depending ‘upon 
the developments in firm and inter-firm organization elsewhere’ 
(Best, 1990:189). This underpinned the strategic dimension of the 
coordinating role of Japanese governmental agencies. 
The nature of Japanese state intervention led Johnson to 
characterize it as a ‘developmental or plan-rational’ state (John-
son, idem), in which bureaucrats played a major role, as they had 
the policymaking or ruling power separated from the reigning 
power of politicians (Johnson, 1995:29). The power of economic 
bureaucracy partly rested on ‘the recruiting and training of the 
most intelligent graduates into elite positions, its strategic control 
over the drafting legislation, its non political character during a very 
long period of one party rule’ (McMillan, 1985: 49). The apolitical 
character was matched with a strongly goal-oriented behavior 
                                                            
2 Johnson refers to the definition given by MITI's Industrial Rationalization White 
Paper. 
3 McMillan (1985:78) holds that “Japan from the 1950s began to substitute do-
mestic coal supplies and hydroelectricity for imported oil.” 30 
aimed at the pursuit of economic and technological development, 
which was strengthened by a low rate of turnover of high level el-
ites (McMillan, idem). Goal setting by economic bureaucracy fea-
tured indicative  planning, one of the components of the high 
growth system. It was distinguished by the absence of any ideo-
logical connotation and was aimed at guiding the industrial activi-
ties of Japan, as the priority was given to the long-term specific in-
dustrial structure. In addition, the leverages used by bureaucrats 
were the control of the acquisition and allocation of raw materials 





6.1  The coordinating role of planning and the government organ-
izational set-up  
 
A relevant aspect of Japanese planning was its function of co-
ordinating the decision-making process, not only among private 
economic agents but also between the latter and government or-
ganizations in charge of the industrialization policy. Coordination 
was allowed by the organizational set-up underlying the planning 
activity, which involved (and still does) a continuous communica-
tion and exchange of information across government departments 
and between public-and-private sector companies and governmen-
tal organizations. For instance, the members of the Economic 
Council, an advisory committee in charge of discussing and formu-
lating the economic plan, were representatives of private industrial 
and business sector, of the academic world, of consumer organi-
zations and labor unions, and often were former bureaucrats. By 
contrast, the Economic Planning Agency carrying on the planning 
activity through drafts and documents was the forum where the 
mediation occurred among the objectives of the different Minis-
tries. In this organizational framework, the government itself ‘acted 
as an effective coordinator of this informational exchange process’ 
(Aoki, 1984: 36). This exchange was based on data analysis taking 
account of the past history of the Japanese economy and enhanc-
ing the capacity to learn from the mistakes of the past (McMillan, 
                                                            
4 Rationalization cartels were favored as a coordinating device (Best, ibidem.). 31 
1985). Data analysis was characterized by the use of inter-industry 
tables and macroeconometric models (Vestal,  idem). The result 
was that planning helped the emergence of a very broad picture of 
the Japanese economic development and of a policy framework 
along with a consensus on economic goals, taking into account the 
specific interests of the agents involved. A by-product of planning 
was a wide range of publications and white papers on economic 
issues, which provided the guidelines to private agents when mak-
ing their choices. These helped the emergence of consistent ex-
pectations on quantitative macro variables such as the growth rate 
(Aoki, idem) and qualitative variables, related, for instance, to the 
type of investment to choose, by allowing the comparison of the 
past performance of the economic system with the future planned 
goals. 
Industrial plans were elaborated consistently with the general 
economic plan. As to the elaboration of industrial policy and its 
specific goals, they were not imposed by the economic bureauc-
racy but were rather the result of the interaction between private 
economic actors and government agencies mainly belonging to 
MITI (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry), mediated by 
bodies of a consultative nature, formally part of the government. 
The MITI set-up was structured into vertical bureaus (genkyoku), 
preparing policies for the different industrial sectors and monitoring 
their performance as to, for instance, demand growth, capacity 
utilization, factor input costs, productivity performance, market 
share, import competition and technology. Through this type of en-
vironmental scanning it was possible to gather information and 
build up a high quality statistical base over time (McMillan, idem), 
crucial for any strategic intervention in the economy. At the same 
time, the horizontal bureaus like the Industrial Policy Bureau dealt 
with problems cutting across industries, with tasks concerning in-
dustrial reorganization, industrial land allocation, provision of raw 
materials and distribution. The vertical and horizontal bureaus of 
MITI functioned as ‘a matrix with a great deal of cross-fertilization 
of ideas, data and strategies, including liaison and coordination 
with other government ministries’ (McMillan, 1985: 53). 
The counterparts in the private sector to the vertical bureaus 
of MITI were industrial associations grouped in the Japan Federa-
tion of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), including manufactur-32 
ing and trading firms, banks and insurance. Their main objective 
was to put forward their point of view along with their own inter-
ests, in their relations with the corresponding genkyoku, and thus 
to shape economic policy. Corporate members, through their as-
sociation, were informed on government policy goals and their 
changes. Moreover, these organizations specific to an industry 
provided governmental agencies with data on production, invento-
ries, shipments and investments, allowing the government to 
gather information necessary to formulate policy at a very low cost 
(Vestal, idem). Private bodies of a consultative nature, like commit-
tees and policy councils (shingikai), played a mediation role be-
tween private and public interests in the process of policy forma-
tion. They were formed by the most senior executives of major 
corporations, former bureaucrats, a few academics and journalists, 
and generally had the responsibility of doing research on a variety 
of economic issues. For instance the Industrial Issues Study 
Council studied the Japanese industrial structure, the conse-
quences of technological innovation and capital liberalization 
(McMillan,  idem).  As the research was the result of continuous 
consultation involving representatives of the business sector, aca-
demia and government agencies, its main feature was the provi-
sion of a complete picture of the functioning of the economic sys-
tem. It was based on an in-depth understanding of the private sec-
tor and the government decision-making process, and of the Japa-
nese economic standing in the international context. 
The organizational framework of Japanese governmental 
agencies therefore allowed information flows encompassing all the 
main agents in the economy and fostered the development of a 
common knowledge base providing an in-depth understanding and 
a vision of the overall economic system. The latter, in particular, 
underpinned the guiding role of government through indicative 
planning and, thus, the coordination between the agencies and 
private economic actors, and among the latter. It contributed to de-
fining the industrialization policy in order to pursue the goals of the 
government. Moreover, the information flows between governmen-
tal agencies and the private agents, along with the common 
knowledge base, facilitated the emergence of a consensus on the 
goals of government organizations and on how to achieve them. 
A relevant role in the transmission of information and knowl-33 
edge were the practices of amakudari (the ‘descent from heaven’) 
and of yoko-suberi (sideslip). According to the former, top-rank bu-
reaucrats in the administrative hierarchy, when retiring, could get 
key positions within the jurisdictional competence of their Ministry 
in the management of private enterprises and in consultative 
committees and political organizations. According to the latter, re-
employment occurred in public corporations or in entities partly fi-
nanced from public funds. The transfer of former bureaucrats to 
private companies implied also the transfer of information and 
knowledge/expertise, accumulated through their past experience 
and concerning the bureaucratic decision-making process, the 
goals of government economic policy as well, and the transfer of 
their previously developed network contacts. The latter, in particu-
lar, allowed for information exchange between the private business 
sector and government agencies. 
The features described above of the institutional set-up fit the 
definition of Japanese society as a 'network organization' (Kumon, 
1992), characterized by an articulated complex of ties among its 
components. In this type of society, information, its transmission 
and the regulation of communication, are the crucial elements to 
reaching consensus on different issues involving the components 
of society. Following Kumon's view, consensus is obtained through 
‘The sharing of information and knowledge - about recognition and 
evaluation of facts, the setting of goals, and actions to achieve 
those goals…’ (Kumon, idem: 128). The network feature of Japa-
nese society, leading to the consensual nature of the interaction 
among the components of the networks, affected (and still does) 
the interaction between the state and its bureaucrats and private 
economic agents. 
Though the effectiveness of Japanese industrialization policy 
in the form of government direct intervention is still a controversial 
issue, it is not misleading to hold that the indirect intervention 
based on the government-guiding role through the provision of in-
formation and the overall vision of the Japanese industrial struc-
ture and economic system, along with its international standing as 
public goods, favored coordination of agents' expectations and of 
their actions in the market-space. 
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7.  Conclusion 
 
 
The  effectiveness of the coordinating role of the market 
through the price-system, and of the State through its intervention 
policy, depends on the type of information and the knowledge base 
inherent in the nature of the coordination problems to be solved. 
As is often stressed, prices as a coordinating device do not always 
convey them. In our analytical framework, the set of options and 
opportunities linked to the existence of spillovers and strategic 
complementarities concerning investments may go unperceived 
due to the dispersion of decision units along with a wide variety of 
information. These factors may hinder the acquisition of bits of in-
formation such as other agents’ characteristics and objectives, 
their current and past behavior, which allow learning from past and 
current experience. This type of information is necessary for the 
emergence of agents' common perception and interpretation of the 
external world, which helps coordination; as individuals may have 
problems of a cognitive nature undermining their ability to identify 
coordination problems and to form expectations on the other 
agents’ choices of strategy. The failure in exploiting the benefits 
deriving from coordination can lead either to a suboptimal level of 
investments, as a single firm when making investment decisions 
may not consider the positive simultaneous and intertemporal ef-
fects on other firms, or not to choose the type of investments fos-
tering economic growth. In this respect, a pertinent question con-
cerns whether the State with its agencies can be endowed with the 
necessary knowledge base and information to support market 
functioning. The answer in the paper is that it can, given that gov-
ernmental agencies as permanent organizations may allow the de-
velopment of a common knowledge base consistent with their ob-
jectives. But this is not sufficient for this to happen, as their internal 
set-up is a determinant for the gathering and transmission of the 
information within and among the organizations and for its e x-
change with the economic agents in the private sector. 
In the case of the Japanese government, the organizational 
set-up was such as to foster continuous information flows within 
and among the governmental agencies, and b etween the latter 
and the consultative bodies in the private sector. Information was 35 
also related to past economic performance, which was essential 
for the periodic formulation and updating of the economic plans, 
mainly playing a coordinating role in the economic system. These 
information flows are held to have contributed to developing a 
common and specific knowledge, consistent with the pursuit of the 
final goal of economic growth, within the governmental agencies, 
in particular MITI. The knowledge base in turn provided a common 
cognitive framework, which was essential for individuating the co-
ordination problems the Japanese economic system was facing 
and for converging on specific solutions. The results of this proc-
ess of information exchange and knowledge accumulation i n-
formed the measures adopted, like indicative planning, for imple-
menting the industrialization policy, and most significantly  were 
provided as a public good to private agents in the form of publica-
tions and white papers in order to facilitate the coordination among 
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